An illustration of a typical result. No real file, name or location is used.
Before — what you would be sending
internal-memo.docxDOCX
Original authora.whitfield
CompanyNorthgate Partners LLP
Total editing time2h 08m
After cleaning
internal-memo-clean.docxDOCX
Original authorremoved
Companyremoved
Total editing timeremoved
Cleaning removes what a tool knows to look for. A retyped copy has no history at all.
The file was made on a machine that knows you
Office documents record the account name of whoever created and last saved them, the company name from the software licence, and how long the file was open. Photographs record the device. A scan may record the scanner. None of this is visible when you read the document.
Copies are safer than originals
Do not forward the file you have. Retype the content into a new document made somewhere unconnected to you, or photograph a screen with a device that has location disabled. A clean copy of the content beats a cleaned copy of the original, because cleaning can only remove what a tool knows to look for.
The route matters as much as the file
Metadata is one channel among several. The account you send from, the network you send over, the time you send it and the pattern of who had access to the document are all part of the same picture. This page addresses the file. It cannot address the rest.
If the stakes are real, get proper advice
Established organisations publish detailed guidance for this situation, and secure submission systems exist that are designed for it. A free web page is a useful check, not a protection strategy.
In practice
Why retyping beats cleaning
Cleaning removes what a tool knows to look for. A document created fresh on an unconnected machine has nothing to look for. The difference matters most in exactly the situation where the stakes are highest, because cleaning tools have blind spots — vendor-specific blocks, formats they do not fully parse, and content that is not metadata at all.
Document-level identifiers
Some organisations vary documents per recipient: a different word here, a different line break there, a slightly different table width. The content reads identically and identifies which copy was leaked. No metadata tool detects this, because there is no metadata involved. Retyping the substance rather than reproducing the document is the only defence.
The parts a file tool cannot address
The account you send from, the network you send over, the time of day, and who had access to the document are all channels of identification. A file checker addresses one of them. Established organisations publish detailed guidance for this situation and operate secure submission systems designed for it, and if the stakes are real those are the right starting point.
Common questions
Is removing metadata enough to stay anonymous?
No. It removes one channel of identification. The account, network, timing and access pattern remain.
Is it safer to retype a document than to clean it?
Generally yes. Cleaning removes what the tool knows about. A fresh document has no history to remove.
Does this page log what I check?
No. Files are read in your browser and nothing about them is transmitted or stored.